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If deliberative democracy is to be more than a critique of current practice and achieve 
the normative goals ascribed to it, its norms must be approximated in practice and 
combine its two elements, popular deliberation with democratic decision-making. In 
combining these we come across a Weberian dilemma between legitimacy and 
effectiveness. One of the most popular methods for institutionalising deliberative 
democracy, that has been suggested, is citizen associations in civil society. However, 
there has been a lack of precise and detailed discussion about how such a system could 
link macro deliberations in public spheres with micro and formal decision-making 
arenas. This paper aims to amend this, and offers a dualist model, which ensures that 
deliberation and decision-making are linked and an effective balance between the 
Weberian dilemma is achieved, through the same secondary associations fulfilling both 
roles. The first part of this strategy focuses on the informal public sphere and its 
networks and their potential to foster deliberative communication between secondary 
associations and between these associations and the state which helps transform 
preferences and set the agenda for decision-making. The second part is mediating 
forums, organized by quangos, with devolved powers, where representatives from 
secondary associations assemble to make decisions based upon the norms of 
deliberative democracy. If deliberative democracy can be approximated in practice then 
it becomes a more persuasive theory as it means the normative goals attributed to it 
could actually be achieved, which is why the dualist method is significant 
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Introduction 
 
Central to deliberative democracy are the beliefs that preferences will adapt to reason, 
as preferences are exogenous and formed during the political process rather than prior to 
it and if deliberation is collective, public reason will be generated as participants take on 
the considerations of others.  Following these core beliefs, deliberative democracy has 
received a number of normative justifications.  Included is the prudential justification 
which suggests that deliberative democracy enables preferences of the participants to 
become more autonomous by overcoming inequalities in information and rationality 
(Festenstein, 2002, 103; Elstub, 2006; Elstub 2008). There is also the epistemic 
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justification which suggests, that deliberative democracy, by generating pubic reason, is 
the decision-making method most likely to lead to decisions that are true, well justified 
or commensurate with justice, needs or the common good (Bohman, 1998, 403; 
Festenstein, 2002, 99; Warren, 2002, 192; Elstub, 2006). A further justification is that 
deliberative democracy produces just decisions, as it represents a set of fair procedures 
in which all have been able to participate equally in debate, which encourages 
participants to consider the preferences of others (Festenstein, 2002, 102-103; Warren, 
2002, 193; Elstub, 2006). In addition these normative claims have been empirically 
supported by an increasing amount of deliberative experiments (Fishkin, 1991, 1995; 
Luskin et al 2002; Hansen, 2004; Andersen & Hansen 2004; Andersen & Jagger, 1999; 
McCombs and Reynolds, 1999; Coote & Lenaghan, 1997; Coote 1997; Renn et al, 
1995; McIver, 1997; Stewart et al, 1994; Kuper, 1997; England, 2000; Barnes, 1999). 
 
 In order to, sufficiently, explore the issues of institutionalization, this paper is 
unable to review these normative arguments, or empirical evidence in any depth. It 
therefore starts from the premise that deliberative democracy is normatively desirable. 
Nevertheless, the issue of institutionalization is central, as these normative goods will 
not be produced if deliberative democracy is an irrelevant and utopian theory because it 
is unachievable in modern complex societies. If this is the case then deliberative 
democracy is a counterfactual ideal and must remain as a critique of actually existing 
democracy (Benhabib, 1996, 84; Femia, 1996; Miller, 2000, 143).  Moreover, if 
deliberative democracy is to deliver the normative goods ascribed to it, then through 
institutionalisation, it must link collective deliberation with decision-making (Squires, 
2002, 142; Dryzek, 2000, 2; Bohman, 1996, 177, Leib, 2004, 5-6 and 39).  There are 
two parts to deliberative democracy; the democratic part is collective decision-making 
through the participation of all relevant actors, while deliberation is the give-and-take of 
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rational arguments (Elster, 1998, 8). If collective deliberation is not linked to decision-
making then the fact participants preferences are more prudent seems irrelevant, better 
decisions will not be made, and decision-making procedures will not be fairer. 
However, attempts at combining deliberation and decision-making with citizen 
participation lead to a Weberian dilemma (1978): ‘Either decision-making institutions 
gain effectiveness at the cost of democratic deliberation or they retain democracy at the 
cost of effective decision-making. In either case citizenship, deliberation, and decision-
making fail to be linked together’ (Bohman, 1996, 178).  
 
Hendriks suggests that there are two broad types of strategy for institutionalizing 
deliberative democracy: Firstly, there is micro deliberative democracy, which focuses 
on ideal deliberative procedures, within structured decision-making arenas within the 
state. Secondly, there is macro deliberative democracy, which favours informal and 
unstructured deliberative communication, aimed at opinion formation, within civil 
society outside and, often against, the formal decision-making institutions of the state. 
Micro deliberation tends to be too elitist, excluding too many participants, while macro 
deliberation is more open, there is a failure to sufficiently empower citizens and make 
their participation effective, unless this deliberative communication is linked to 
decision-making and micro venues.  Therefore, Hendriks argues that it is essential for 
both micro and macro deliberative democracy to be integrated (Hendriks, 2006). If 
deliberation is located only in civil society then we must be sceptical as to whether the 
resulting decisions could be actualised, if they cannot be, then popular sovereignty is 
lost. This paper offers a dualist model of deliberative and associational democracy, 
arguing it provides a reasonable balance to the Weberian dilemma by connecting the 
macro deliberations of citizens with micro democratic decision-making institutions. It 
involves two dimensions for secondary associations, the first is their participation in the 
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communicative processes of the informal public sphere; the second is their 
incorporation into the institutionalised and decision-making processes of the formal 
public sphere.1  
 
The dualist model for institutionalizing deliberative, and associational, 
democracy offered here accepts a liberal democratic and capitalist framework, and the 
many limitations this system, and its distribution of power, presents for approximating 
the ideal of deliberative democracy. This is because closer approximation of 
deliberative democracy in practice must start from the here and now: ‘alternative 
institutions cannot be made out of air. Both imagining and external alternative 
institutions must begin with some elements of existing social life’ (Young, 1995, 207). 
Nevertheless, it is still maintained that there is room for significant institutional change 
within the liberal democratic system that would lead to significant normative 
developments, and the dualist model of deliberative, and associational, democracy, 
outlined here, still represents a radical break from the current institutional system.  
 
Therefore, this paper argues that, a dualist strategy remains a promising strategy 
for institutionalising deliberative democracy. In contrast to Habermas (1996) and 
Hendriks, the paper envisages the same secondary association communicating in the 
informal public sphere, and participating in making legislation in the formal public 
sphere. The ‘formal deliberative structures’ would therefore not function ‘in a separate 
realm from active public spheres’, which is Hendriks’s main concern of associational 
democracy as a method of institutionalising deliberative democracy (Hendriks, 2006, 
497). The model here then significantly differs from Hendriks’s ‘integrated system’ as 
she is against associational democracy altogether, due to skepticism that associations 
will represent a sufficient diversity of citizens, that associational representatives would 
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be good deliberators due to inevitable partiality, and that they could avoid being co-
opted by the state (Hendriks, 2006, 497). These significant concerns will be responded 
too in the course of the paper. Overall it is suggested that this dualist method offers a 
reasonable trade-off to the Weberian dilemma, effectively combining deliberation of 
citizens with decision-making and enabling deliberative democracy to be approximated 
and there-by achieving the normative goods that have been ascribed to it. 
  
The Informal Public Sphere 
 
In liberal democracies, despite currently not approximating deliberative democracy very 
closely, civil society generates deliberation through communication between its 
organisations, which forms a generalised debate in the informal public sphere. The 
public sphere can be characterised as ‘the space in which citizens deliberate about their 
common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction’ (Fraser, 
1992, 110). These public spheres can appear at local, national, international or 
functional level and are examples of macro deliberative democracy. Following 
Habermas (1996), it is suggested that the informal public sphere is capable of fulfilling 
two key elements of the dualist approach: the creation of ‘public opinion’ and ‘agenda 
setting’.  
 
Public spheres are dependent upon flows of communication between secondary 
associations and other organisations. The role of associations as communicators in the 
public sphere is an intrinsic one, as associations are established through communication 
between individuals themselves and because many try to influence the preferences of 
the general public and members of other associations by representing and voicing the 
views and interests of their members (Habermas, 1996, 369; Warren, 2001a, 78-80;). 
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These flows of communication can then influence the opinions of the public and will be 
more likely to be based upon reason and be publicly orientated, as in order to convince 
the ‘general public’ of the validity of their concerns and preferences, associations must 
be able to ‘employ and appeal to norms of publicity’; limiting their potential to act as 
strategic actors. It is these factors that make informal public spheres such promising 
locations for deliberative democracy. A dualist model of associational democracy is 
likely to enhance these processes; as secondary associations become more important 
political actors their discourses will too. Outside the informal public sphere, many 
organisations avoid public processes so they can assert private interests and maneuver 
themselves to gain vested state powers via non-public processes, through funding 
political parties, lobbying and private consultation that leads to the subversion of formal 
representative institutions. Associations that are vested will try to avoid public debate 
and employ money and power to achieve their goals, only entering into public debate 
when they are forced to justify their actions, privileges and preferences (Warren, 2001, 
165).  When bargaining with government officials, sanctions and rewards are used to 
apply pressure on the government, however, inside the public sphere, the effect of 
interest groups is limited as these techniques are ineffectual as convincing reasons 
become increasingly influential at transforming preferences and mobilising public 
opinion: ‘Public opinion can be manipulated, but neither publicly bought nor publicly 
blackmailed’ (Habermas, 1996, 364). With associations participating in public, 
deliberative and legislative forums, the influence pressure groups could gain through 
private processes will be lessened, even though processes of lobbying are likely to never 
be eliminated. Hayek argues that such consequences are ‘the inescapable result of a 
system in which government has unlimited powers to take whatever measures are 
required to satisfy the wishes of those on whose support it relies’  (Hayek, 1979, 13-15). 
However, in the dualist system, envisaged here, governmental powers will be 
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significantly reduced, as the devolved forums will become the primary legislative 
bodies, with each forum responsible for only a few policies. Despite this there will still 
be plenty to gain for interest groups by accessing the government through private 
processes, as the government will still play a significant role, especially in relation to 
agenda setting. This then seems an inevitable consequence of liberal democratic rights, 
as it is not possible to outlaw lobbying and private bargaining relationships with state 
representatives.  Therefore, it is perhaps the best we can hope for, and a significant 
achievement, to reduce these private and unequal methods of influence for civil society.  
 
 If the decision-making agenda is to reflect the public discourses of the informal 
public sphere it should be set through the ‘outside access model’, as it is the only model 
of agenda setting that endorses communication in the informal public sphere. The 
pressure upon the formal political system to consider the issue, from the informal public 
sphere can be produced in three broad ways, all of which can be both democratic or 
undemocratic: A group can articulate a grievance, communicate with other groups (with 
the aim that they take on board the issue) and pressurise decision-makers to deal with 
the issue and put it on the formal agenda (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976, 132). More 
specifically, the informal public sphere can change political discourse, which in turn 
affects how ‘terms are defined’, ‘issues are framed’ and can ‘influence political culture’ 
e.g. racial equality and feminist movements. Through the establishment of its own 
policy forums, pressure can be placed on legislative bodies, holding them accountable.2  
Finally, protest located in the public sphere can pose the threat of political instability, 
causing the government to react in some way (Dryzek, 2000, 101-103). 
 
The media plays a significant role in communicating ideas, needs preferences 
and issues within the informal public sphere. In fact the mass media constitute publics 
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themselves, as one of their primary roles is to induce public debate on issues that it 
raises and to justify the raising of such issues.  However, the media, in liberal 
democracies, currently reflects, and consequently reinforces, the vast disparities of 
economic, and political power and is not accessible to all actors in civil society. 
Associations outside the political system, or outside large organisations, will have a 
much reduced chance of influencing the media output due to its market structure. This 
factor is accentuated, if the views of the association fall outside ‘centrist’ or ‘established 
opinions’ that dominate the media (Habermas, 1996, 377; Bohman, 1996, 132 and 140-
1; Warren, 2001, 168).   Therefore the transformation of the media is probably one of 
the most essential requirements for the meaningful approximation of deliberative 
democracy (Habermas, 1996, 378).  Exactly what framework the media would need to 
take, and how these changes would occur, is a study in itself, and therefore outside the 
remit of this paper.  Nevertheless, normatively a democratic and pluralised media, 
which did not tacitly reflect inequalities, is necessary. 
 
 
 Therefore, in liberal democracies, although the agenda tends not be formed 
through this method, civil society still plays a ‘surprisingly active and momentous role’ 
(Habermas, 1996, 381).  For example opposition to nuclear arms and power, genetic 
engineering, ecological threats, third world debt, the encumbrance of risk, racial 
discrimination and gender inequality have all arisen from the informal public sphere 
(Beck, 1999; Habermas, 1996, 359). Therefore, the informal public sphere can change 
institutions, forcing them to adapt to new publics offering new visions, interpretations, 
issues and beliefs.  Institutions must somehow interact with these new publics, even if 
they are simply trying to suppress them rather than democratically communicate with 
them:  ‘In the process, institutions are changed in a variety of ways:  in their concerns, 
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in their ongoing interpretation of rules and procedures, in their predominant problem-
solving strategies and so on’ (Bohman, 1996, 201). A deliberative, and associational, 
dualist model increases the chances that the ‘outside initiative model’ of agenda setting 
is employed by making secondary associations a key locus of political participation and 
representation. Consequently, the media and state will inevitably be encouraged to give 
the public sphere more attention, just as political parties receive much attention now. If 
they did not, then, their credibility and legitimacy would seriously be challenged as 
secondary associations will also become central legislative participants through the 
decentralised forums, as will be discussed in more detail in the following section.3 
 
Micro-deliberative sights, such as the forums, require a clear and, often, 
narrowly focused agenda to be effective and enable rational decision-making. However, 
the danger is that elites can provide an overly narrow agenda that excludes the views of 
affected groups by its definition and therefore frame the decision. As already suggested 
the greater focus on informal public spheres provided in a dualist model, advocated 
here, helps overcome this, enabling macro-deliberative processes to provide an agenda 
which generates open debate over the agenda and its definition.  Nevertheless this is 
unlikely to be specific enough for the forums, and the agendas arising from the macro-
public sphere will still need to be interpreted and, inevitably, this seems to be a role that 
will involve current political elites (Parkinson, 2006, 128-133). However, the process of 
interpreting the competing agendas of the informal public sphere could still be 
combined with more democratically deliberative methods. An innovative idea from 
Parkinson is for local and national governments to have committees whose function is 
to gather submissions from civil society groups. This could be combined with processes 
like an ‘electronic town hall’ where thousands of citizens would assemble to debate and 
vote on the agenda before it is formalised (Parkinson, 2006, 170), and this would make 
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agenda setting a more equal process. However, there are other problems relating to 
inequality of access to the informal public sphere. 
 
In current liberal democratic societies, the informal public sphere is plagued by 
inequality of access, which would affect its potential to fulfil deliberative roles in a 
democratic manner and would enable the discourses of the powerful to dominate. For 
example, Fraser argues that socio-economic inequalities cause the cultural ethos, 
developed by socio-economic groups, to be unequally valued. She further suggests that 
in everyday life, and within the public sphere, such powers are magnified because 
inequality, in the political economy, affects opportunities for access to participation, 
therefore, meaning public spheres are not, and cannot be, neutral and equally 
‘expressive of any and every cultural ethos’ (Fraser, 1992, 120). This inequality 
severely limits a public sphere’s potential to fulfil both deliberative and democratic 
roles.  Habermas is right, however, that ‘influence’ cannot entirely escape democratic 
connotations despite these inequalities, as unless the public finds the assertions of 
associations convincing in some way, they will not be influenced by them.  This is 
because communication rather than money or bureaucracy is the dominant media in the 
public sphere (Habermas, 1996).   
 
Habermas envisages a single public sphere, suggesting that socio-economic 
inequalities can be ‘bracketed’ so that participants deliberate together as peers. This 
view seems mistaken, as Fraser is aware; all discursive arenas are situated in a broader 
socio-economic environment, which forms many aspects of the individual participants, 
making it impossible for participants to bracket these inequalities. ‘Bracketing’ would 
also be biased towards the dominant social groups as it is ‘tantamount to filtering 
diverse rhetorical and stylistic norms through a single, overarching lens’ (Fraser, 1992, 
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120-6). Fraser suggests multiple public spheres are the solution, as they provide 
subordinate groups with the arenas to deliberate and form collective preferences, goals, 
strategies and identities away from the unequal influence of dominant groups. This is 
important because participation in a public sphere is not just about asserting neutral 
preferences, but about forming ones own identity, preferences and needs.  This is why 
subordinate social groups e.g. women, workers, racial minorities, homosexuals and the 
disabled have been motivated to form alternative publics, or what Fraser terms 
‘subaltern counter publics’ (Fraser, 1992, 123). These are enclaves that are often 
excluded and become factionalised by the political process. Nevertheless, they aim to 
disseminate their beliefs, and communicate these to as broad a public as possible, 
through networks with other associations and between public spheres (Fraser, 1992, 
124). Although not all networks are public, they do enable secondary associations to 
spread their message to other public spheres that would otherwise not hear, or address, 
such issues. In addition, networks enable the pooling of resources and information 
between, as well as within, secondary associations and therefore create economies of 
scale that can address some of the socio-economic inequalities that exist when a group 
is trying to be heard (Bohman, 1996, 136). The dualist model outlined in this paper has 
many features that should aid the multiplication of existing public spheres, such as 
functional and territorial devolution, the creation of a multiplicity of legislative arenas- 
the mediating forums- and the promotion of secondary associations to a prominent role 
in governance. The pluralism inherent in the associational system will also help soften 
the undemocratic effects of inequality.  If citizens have multiple and fluid membership 
in associations then the inequalities from each sphere should be contained, to a certain 
extent, as well as ensuring that democratic power is not determined by any single 
ascriptive characteristic (Warren, 2001, 215).   
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Although multiple public spheres would help reduce some features of inequality 
it would not remove the social and economic relationships that cause these inequalities.  
Therefore, there would still be barriers to participation such as the lack of resources 
(money, the distribution, number and type of associational members) and discrimination 
that would prevent equal participation in the associational and decision-making system.  
The distribution of income and education, significantly, affects levels of participation 
(Verba et al, 1995) so, further measures to rectify the effects of existing inequalities of 
wealth, race and gender on opportunities to participate in the political process must also 
be addressed (Young, 1990, 72), especially as inequalities in power and money are 
perpetuated in associational membership (Skocpol 1999; Verba et al, 1995, chapter 12; 
Schattsneider, 1975; Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Van Deth, 1997, 9).  Cohen and 
Rogers suggest limiting individual financial contributions to political groups, lowering 
barriers of entry to political processes and macro-economic measures such as 
‘inheritance taxes, income redistribution and subsidies for the organisation and 
representation of under-represented interests’ to prevent excessive inequalities being 
generated in the first place (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, 37).  Young suggests there is a 
need for differentiated resource allocation to associations by the state, to address 
inequalities between social groups that have arisen from historical processes of 
disadvantage and oppression (Young, 1995, 212).  
 
Such measures are definitely necessary, but waiting for distributive fairness, 
before aiming for greater participative opportunities, would not only postpone 
deepening democracy to an ‘indefinite utopian future’, but also make this achievement 
exceptionally unlikely, as this participation is necessary for achieving greater 
distributive fairness (Young, 1990, 94).  Without changing the parameters for 
distributive decisions that have been stabilised in welfare capitalist states for some time, 
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significantly greater socio-economic equality cannot be achieved.  The dualist model 
discussed here will alter the parameters by including new participants (Schattsneider, 
1975) into distributive decision-making processes and by promoting the use of 
deliberation in decision-making, which should also help overcome inequalities.  
 
Macro deliberations, like the informal public spheres discussed here, are suitable 
for generating deliberative influence and opinion formation, but are, what Fraser (1992) 
terms, ‘weak’ publics as they are usually peripheral to decision-making arenas. In order 
for deliberative democracy to be approximated, the Weberian dilemma to be 
successfully resolved, and the normative goals attributed to it generated, arenas for 
collective decisions are also required. Decision-making arenas are ‘strong’ publics, and 
examples of micro deliberation. Micro-deliberative fora are further required to help 
counter the inequalities that might exist in the informal public spheres discussed above 
(Hendriks, 2006, 496). It is these formal arenas to which the paper now turns its 
attention. 
 
The Formal Public Sphere- Mediating Forums 
 
The suggestion here is that mediating forums, with territorially and functionally 
devolved powers, could be legislative arenas where representatives from relevant 
secondary associations would assemble and, therefore, fulfill the second branch of the 
dualist strategy. It is essential that these forums are legislative arenas that produce 
binding decisions in the form of policy that would be implemented and enforced by the 
relevant level of government if the Weberian dilemma is to be evaded. Without power 
over policy the arrangements would fail to sufficiently meet the democratic criteria and 
therefore generate the normative goals attributed to deliberative democracy. The main 
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flaw of Hendriks’s (2006, 501) ‘integrated deliberative system’, which also combines 
micro and macro deliberative sites, is that it only results in ‘recommendations for 
decision-makers’, rather than decision-making: ‘Democracy involves debate and 
discussion, but these are not enough if they remain inconclusive and ineffective in 
determining actual policies’ (Dahl cited in Gastill, 1993, 16).  
 
One of the principal functional advantages of associations being involved in 
decision-making, legislative, processes is that once the decision has been made, it 
generally becomes easier to introduce and enforce (Barber, 1984; Fung and Wright, 
2001, 26), which contributes, significantly, to balancing the Weberain dilemma. The 
forums are also likely to result in less legal challenges, something which plagues much 
environmental legislation (Fiorino, 1995) meaning a deliberative and associational 
democracy could lead to less costly legislation and more expeditious policy legislation 
(Hunold, 2001, 154). As the forums increase the likely-hood that all relevant views will 
be included in decision-making, legislation is more likely to survive legal challenges if 
they do occur (Hunold, 2001, 154-155). Due to the fact that legislation is now easier to 
enforce, more options become open to political debate, rather than being ruled out tout 
court (Fung and Wright, 2001, 18). It also means powerful organisations will have less 
ability to veto any legislation that they dislike because their co-operation will become 
less important, due to the increased co-operation of other associations (Cohen and 
Rogers, 1995, 65-66; Smith, 2001, 78).   
 
There are many other issues and problems that must be addressed if these 
mediating forums are going to be seen as a credible alternative to the current legislative 
bodies’ dominant in liberal democracies. Many of these will be addressed in a bid to 
provide more detail to this sketch of these institutions. The nature and manner of 
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decentralisation to the forums will be considered, the paper will then set out how 
quangos could take responsibility for organising these forums, specify what role 
existing institutions of governance would fulfil under this dualist system and finally 
address the nature and form of representation in the forums. Firstly there will be a 
consideration of relevant empirical evidence from other deliberative forums, which 
might provide an indication of how these associational mediating forums might operate. 
 
Empirical Evidence from Deliberative Forums 
 
These associational forums bare a resemblance to European corporatism (Warren, 2001, 
119), but corporatism has dramatically fewer groups integrated into the decision-making 
process, and the groups that are included, are stable, changing little (Offe, 1995, 120). 
Moreover, corporatist discussions tend to be private, rather than public affairs (Hunold, 
2001, 161).  
 
Consequently, we can’t look to traditional, and tried and tested, corporatist 
arrangements, to gain insight to how the mediating forums might actually operate. 
Sanders (1997, 365–366) points to evidence from juries to demonstrate that it is not the 
quality of reasons that will persuade people in deliberative settings, but group dynamics 
and power structures. She argues that those who speak more gain more influence, and 
that those who speak the most are white males. In contrast Fishkin and Luskin (2000) 
cite evidence from deliberative opinion polls that suggest all social groups are able to 
participate fairly.  
 
This seems to demonstrate that the forums require procedures to ensure that all 
have an equal opportunity to participate and effective moderation can ensure this 
  
16 
(Parkinson, 2006, 86-87). Sanders herself acknowledges that many of these problems 
can be overcome if evidence-driven deliberation is employed. In this method certain 
options and opinions are discussed without deliberators being categorized or formerly 
associated with any particular perspective (Sanders, 1997, 367). This method is more 
inclusive because it encourages all views to be expressed and so more participants speak 
and this in turn causes more people to change their opinions. The evidence-based 
approach can also incorporate difference and there is a greater emphasis of all 
participants trying to reach an acceptable decision for all, rather than having one view 
winning out, as it avoids people conforming with majority opinion due to the force of 
conformity (Sanders, 1997, 367). It might be difficult to ensure that this method of 
deliberation is always employed in the forums as some associations will have clearly 
linked themselves to certain views through their activity in the informal public sphere, 
nevertheless it should remain the aim. 
 
There is extensive empirical evidence available from unpartisan deliberative 
forums like citizens’ juries and deliberative opinion polls that indicates citizens have the 
competence to address complicated issues, that participants will change their 
preferences in light of reasons and information, and that they can arrive at compromised 
decisions  (Fishkin, 1991, 1995; Luskin et al 2002; Hansen, 2004; Andersen & Hansen 
2004; Andersen & Jagger, 1999; McCombs and Reynolds, 1999; Coote & Lenaghan, 
1997; Coote 1997; Renn et al, 1995; McIver, 1997; Stewart et al, 1994; Kuper, 1997; 
England, 2000; Barnes, 1999). Perhaps more revealing research, on citizen juries, for 
the purposes here, from Thompson and Hoggert (2001), is concerned with the 
development of factions, within deliberative arenas, that could offset the benefits of the 
deliberative process. They advocate combining deliberative plenary sessions with 
subdivided deliberative fora, as in small groups, factions and ‘internal psychological 
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divisions’ are less likely to develop. Moreover, these subgroups do not need to have 
‘rigidly defined boundaries’, if the subgroups have revolving membership, as with 
German planning cells. This further ensures all get to hear the views of all, and get to 
express their views to all (Thompson and Hoggert, 2001, 358).  
 
However, all this research is based on non-partisan deliberations, and 
consequently fails to fully indicate how the associational mediating forums might 
operate. Partisan deliberative forums, though, are on the increase, and although they do 
not replicate the associational forums, outlined here, especially in the aspect of 
decentralizing final and binding decision-making power to the forums, which is 
obviously a crucial dynamic, they do provide insight and lessons about how deliberation 
in such arenas is likely to proceed. Evidence from Barnes et al (2004), in their study of a 
range of forums in the UK, indicates that deliberation, in forums, is not always 
generated even though citizens enter into dialogue with officials. This occurs due to a 
lack of awareness, and inclusion of, varying types and sources of knowledge, discourses 
and forms of expression and also differing levels of respect for participants. It is 
consequently suggested that deliberation can be more successful in identity sharing 
groups, (which bodes well for deliberation within the associations) rather than ‘forums 
established by officials’ (as the forums advocated here are) (Barnes, Knops, Newman, 
Sullivan, 2004, 106). Here we see the Weberian dilemma present again, as deliberation 
might well operate most successfully away from locations where it cannot directly 
affect decisions. However, this is largely overcome if the participants have prior 
experience of participation (which the associational members should quickly gain in this 
model) and if ‘prior to engagement with officials’ they are able to ‘construct their own 
definitions…’ of the issues to be debated’ (Barnes, Knops, Newman, Sullivan, 2004, 
107). In the dualist model the debates within associations and within the informal public 
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sphere should ensure this occurs.  
 
Empirical research on a variety of devolved, partisan and deliberative forums, 
from around the world, co-ordinated by Fung and Wright (2001, 2003), suggests that, 
despite these threats, the dualist model, of deliberative and associational democracy, 
would provide several routes to the balancing of power, to enable deliberation to occur 
in the forums.  First, experts and citizens in the forums will both have to justify their 
views to each other through reasons, which places them on a more equal. Furthermore, 
the presence of other partisan, associational, representatives will assist in the checking 
and regulation of powerful groups who might attempt to capture the deliberative process 
to pursue narrow self-interests (Fung and Wright, 2001, 22). The forums will include 
the subordinate groups who are usually excluded from decision-making arenas, and 
because they are participating, the resulting decisions are likely to be fairer. Relative 
equality will also be aided through the decisions the forums make by ‘delivering 
effective public action to those who do not generally enjoy this good’ (Fung and 
Wright, 2001, 26). Moreover, because the forums will be deliberative, decisions are 
more likely to be based on reason, as opposed to money, power, numbers or status, and 
therefore lead to more equitable policies (Fung and Wright, 2001, 26; Habermas, 1996; 
Warren, 2001). In reality, people will not only adapt preferences in accordance with 
reasons, but also due to other factors such as the source of the information, the manner 
in which it is provided, the psychological dynamic of the group and pressure to conform 
with the majority. Despite this, ‘reasons’ remain privileged in deliberative democracy, 
in comparison to other forms of decision-making. 
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Decentralisation 
 
The forums outlined here would require a considerable increase in decentralisation than 
currently present in most liberal democracies. There is nothing inherently democratic 
about decentralisation as it can mean the restriction/ elimination of legitimate 
participants from participating in collective decisions (Warren, 2001a, 196), and is 
therefore only democratic to the extent that it ‘socialises conflict’ by linking collective 
actions to collective justifications and includes all those affected (Schattsneider, 1975; 
see also Warren, 2001a, 201-202).  Decentralisation therefore needs to be based upon a 
sound principle in order to provide guidance on who should receive devolved powers, 
on what policy areas, to what extent and how is it should be implemented?  One 
possibility is ‘subsidiarity’, which legislates for both regional and functional 
decentralisation.  
 
Subsidiarity4 is about finding the right level for decisions to be taken, the key 
ideas being that there are various levels of organisation, of which the nation state is just 
one, and that there is an apt and relevant level of organisation for each function that 
society wishes to pursue. Overall the principle’s guiding idea is that ‘decisions are taken 
as closely as possible to the citizen’ (Follesdal, 1999, 3). The application of this 
principle would significantly alter the dynamic of power distribution, dominant in 
liberal democracies, as subsidiarity demands that only if the function cannot be 
achieved at the lower level should it then be passed up to the higher level.  Although the 
tendency will predominantly be towards decentralisation, the exact content of what 
decisions should be taken and at what level are not stipulated by the principle and would 
have to be decided through the political process, ideally a deliberatively democratic one. 
This presents a significant problem for a transition to a deliberative and associational 
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democracy as such decisions are initially likely to be made through current processes. 
Examples can still be envisaged and proposed though, and types of health and social 
care delivery, bus transport and planning could all be determined, to an important 
extent, locally, and with the interpretation of ‘local’ varying from context to context and 
allowing for ‘delineated ecosystem habitats’ (Fung and Wright, 2001, 21), thought 
essential for democratic environmental control (Eckersley, 2000, 120). Issues requiring 
functional forums include telecommunications and bio-technology, where as issues 
relating to foreign policy and national defence are likely be made nationally. 
 
In order to ensure effective control and accountability of forum representatives, 
by those being represented, there should only be two layers of deliberation and 
decision-making in the dualist model, the first being direct participation in the 
associations and the second representatives from these associations participating in the 
forums.  Although there should be functional forums organised across territorial 
boundaries and forums territorially organised at local and regional level there must not 
be several levels of forums for the formation of any one policy so the decision cannot be 
passed up to a further forum with representatives coming from the ‘lower’ forum.  This 
means that a series of forums on a particular issue cannot be held with every locality 
holding a forum, and then these forum representatives moving on to a regional forum 
and representatives from the regional forum then moving up to a national forum, with 
the result being a national policy addressing the issue or even passing to a transnational 
forum. In such circumstances, the logic would be for the association’s representatives, 
participating in the local forum, to elect the representatives to participate in the regional 
forum and so on. This would mean that at the regional, and especially the national 
forums, the representatives would have little credibility over the claim that they 
represent their constituents and that they are accountable as they would be too far 
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removed from the citizenry by too many layers of forums and representation.  If 
decisions need to be made that cut across the local and regional territories, then they 
must be made through functionally decentralised forums.  If a national policy is 
required over an issue then this must be made by national government, if a transnational 
decision is necessary then this should be made in transnational institutions.5 This 
demonstrates how essential it is that the principle of subsidiarity be applied coherently 
and consistently when decentralising powers, which in reality will not always be 
possible due to the difficulty of, and the compromises that will inevitably be made, 
when interpreting subsidiarity through the political system 
 
Due to the serial deliberative structures, and the territorially and functionally 
devolved forums, there is potentially a problem of transmission and co-ordination of the 
decisions (Goodin, 2003, 56). Decentralisation can encourage participants to see the 
issue under debate as ‘unique, isolated phenomena abstracted from social relations.’ 
Furthermore, participants, forum organisers and mediators could be compelled to see 
disputes in this manner, as it would make them ‘easier to mediate and resolve’ (Smith, 
2001, 78). There is then inevitably a discursive dilemma, similar to Weber’s, that again 
relates to the problem of combining democracy and deliberation. Decisions could be 
responsive to the reflective preferences of the representatives assembled in the forum, 
regardless of whether they are rationally compatible with decisions made previously in 
other forums.6 Alternatively decisions could be rationally consistent, but be 
unresponsive to representative’s preferences.  The former is more democratic, but at a 
sacrifice to deliberation and the latter more deliberative, but at a loss to democracy 
(Pettit, 2003, 138).  In the mediating forums advocated here the decisions will inevitably 
be responsive to participant’s preferences, but for Pettit this means the decisions will be 
arbitrary and capricious (Pettit, 2003, 155).  He argues it is more important that 
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decisions meet deliberative requirements and are rationally compatible than be 
democratically responsive. One solution is to ensure that all decisions remain 
contestable, especially as participants will change over time (Pettit, 2003, 156). This 
seems appropriate and the forums should continue until the legislation has then been 
reviewed and if necessary reformed. In addition, once the forum has become defunct a 
new forum could be generated to readdress the issue and provide reform if required. 
 
In general Pettit’s discursive dilemma is a dilemma for decision-making in 
general and it could be alleviated by the flexibility of the mediation process, which is a 
feature of this dualist model, as the forums can operate at a variety of levels and across 
an array of functions  (Smith, 2001, 80), which are also strengths of associations. 
Moreover, due to the mediation being based upon the norms of democratic deliberation, 
no arguments or reasons are formally excluded, so there is nothing to prevent any of the 
participants from trying to put the issues into a broader agenda.  Whether these reasons 
have any motivational force to the other participants depends then on their 
convincingness.    What then might be required, is not decentralisation to the forums per 
se but, co-ordinated decentralisation, where-by decisions from successful forums are 
disseminated and diffused (Fung and Wright, 2001, 22-23), which could be achieved 
through networks among secondary associations, local and national government and 
quangos. Therefore multiple policies will, with varying techniques and strategies, be 
pursued simultaneously with both the successes and failures being passed on resulting 
in ‘the learning capacity of the system as a whole’ being enriched (Fung and Wright, 
2001, 26). The dualist model of deliberative and associational democracy, advocated 
here sees an even more important role for quangos, to which we now turn. 
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Quangos and forum organization 
 
The forums will need to be organised and facilitated and this paper suggests quangos are 
suitable organizations to fulfil this role. This may seem like a curious choice, as 
quangos have been severely criticised for their lack of democratic credentials and 
labeled as arenas void of democratic arrangements and processes of accountability. 
Indeed they currently privilege bureaucrats, professionals and technical experts with 
many roles of governance enabling them to make key policy decisions, provide advice 
and take action away from public scrutiny (Weir, 1996, 20). They are often complex 
and inaccessible to the public, which enhances collective action problems and therefore 
discourages popular participation (Weir, 1996, 29). In addition, they are formed through 
appointment rather than election (Flinders, 1999, 8; Harden and Marquand, 1997, 13) 
and there is a whole raft of evidence in the UK, which suggests a dubious correlation 
between the party in government and appointments to quangos of sympathisers of the 
governing party (Flinders, 1999, 11). Those quangos not appointed by government 
ministers tend to be self-appointing, which raises further questions about undue 
influence and accountability. 
 
Despite their lack of legitimacy, in the last twenty years, liberal democracies 
have seen continual quango growth, in terms of number, scope and functional area that 
they cover. It has become an assumption of central government that quangos can more 
effectively implement certain policy areas, as they are at a ‘distance’ from the relevant, 
but inevitably bureaucratic government departments and local authorities (Harden and 
Marquand, 1997, 10-11) and can help overcome the complexity of decisions by 
providing functional expertise (Weir, 1996, 21). Consequently, contemporary 
legislation tends to provide a framework leaving much scope for quangos to formulate 
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rules and regulations (Hunold, 2001, p. 151). 
 
If quangos are essential to modern governance the greater the legitimacy 
quangos have the greater their potential for service delivery and effective governance 
(Harden and Marquand, 1997, 19). According to Harden and Marquand this legitimacy 
should be enhanced through the extension of openness, participation and increased 
transparency in the decision-making process, while the decisions should be based upon 
reason and publicly available information (Harden and Marquand, 1997, 20- 24). In the 
UK, quangos are required to have some mechanisms in place for citizen participation 
(Davies, 2007, 50), although, in practice, these mechanisms have questionable 
democratic credentials often leading to co-option of participants, to achieve a veil of 
legitimacy (Milewa, 2004; Clarke, 2002). The National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
is an example of better practice and is now seen as a type of ‘dialogic intermediary 
organization’, where quangos engage a range of stakeholders in dialogue (Davies, 
2007).  
 
These associations are particularly useful at forming and organising information 
due to the fact that they specialise in certain areas which are of particular relevance to 
their members and this provides counter-knowledge to these experts. Furthermore, 
associations create a division of labour in the collection and organisation of information, 
achieving economies of scale that enable citizens to acquire levels of information that 
they would be unable to obtain by themselves (Warren, 2001, 71-72; Cohen and Rogers, 
1995, 42-43; Hirst, 1994, 34-40). In addition, due to their close involvement with the 
members, they can provide information that would otherwise be unavailable to the 
distant state representatives and, or, quango experts such as experiential knowledge 
(Davies, 2007, 56; Cohen and Rogers, 1995, 43) which is vital to ensuring inclusion in 
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the deliberative process (Sanders, 1996; Young, 1996).  
 
Therefore, in order to maximize openness and the availability of relevant 
information, quangos would also have to ensure that no relevant association is excluded 
from the forums. To achieve this it is essential that participants, in the forums, are self-
selecting.  If the relevant government agency, mediators or quango members decide 
selection and have the power to exclude interested agents then vital interests and views 
will inevitably be excluded and the decision can be framed (Rippe and Schaber, 1999, 
82).  This both undermines democracy, as there are those who could be affected by the 
collective decision that are excluded, and undermines deliberation as relevant views; 
information and reasons are not heard. Moreover, it is more likely that the groups 
excluded from the forums would be those who are currently excluded by present modes 
of political party and territorial representation. Quangos are a more suitable vehicle to 
achieve this than governments because they are removed from the potential bias of the 
adversarial party political process and the potential political bias that comes with it. In 
addition, in comparison to state legislatures, quangos tend to have much more (often 
daily) contact with relevant secondary associations, with this contact often based on 
dialogue (Selden, Brudney and Kellough, 1988; Vinzant and Crothers 1998, both cited 
in Hunold, 2001, 157-158; Davies, 2007). Currently, this is a very unequal relationship, 
with the bureauacrats dominating and also rarely changing their views due to this 
dialogue (Gould, Schnailberg and Weinberg, 1996; Aronson 1993; Timney 1995, all 
cited in Hunold, 2001, 158; Davies, 2007, 56-57). However, the forums would change, 
and equalize this relationship, as the bureaucrats would no longer be making the 
decisions themselves, but in conjunction with the associational representatives. What 
this does indicate though is the suitability of quangos to identify the key stakeholders, as 
they have a history of constant engagement with them, although this contact tends to be 
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with the dominant associations (Hunold, 2001, 159).  In order to avoid this, the forums 
must be well advertised across a diversity of media so that relevant associations are 
aware of the forums.  It will also be necessary for the forum organisers to identify and 
contact key stakeholders, and hopefully, with the establishment of networks between 
associations, recruitment will also be aided. Quangos are a more suitable vehicle to 
achieve this than governments because they are removed from the potential bias of the 
adversarial party political process. 
 
A further strength of quangos in relation to forum organization is their 
flexibility. The mediating forums aim to include associational representatives for all 
those affected by a decision. This raises some significant practical problems over who is 
affected and to what extent. This variability of affectedness has increased as society 
becomes more complex with ‘rapid change and fluid boundaries’ (Parkinson, 2006, 5). 
Saward, suggests we need a new political unit for each political decision (Saward in 
Smith, 2001, 75-76). This is a significant advantage of mediation as it, ‘tends to be a 
one off conflict resolution or problem solving process’ (Smith, 2001, 81), meaning it is 
more flexible for institutionalising decision-making.7 Quangos are also very flexible as 
they are not territorially fixed, regularly morph in shape and size, multiply and even 
break-up and reform (Weir, 1996, 21).  If they are employed to set up and mediate the 
associational forums under government guidelines, the institutional flexibility could be 
met. 
 
The quangos and the forums that they organise, would only be temporary and formed to 
address a specific issue that had reached the agenda, ideally through the outside 
initiative model outlined above.  The quango could then be set up to hold a forum.  The 
forum would last for as long as it took to make the collective decision, implement the 
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policy (which would be carried out by the relevant elected parliament or council at 
either local, regional and national level or quango if it is a functionally based issue), 
review the policy, and make any necessary amendments to the policy.  This review 
processes would also be considerably more speedy because decentralization would 
mean ‘the distance and time between decisions, action, effect, observation, and 
reconsideration’ is vastly reduced, so if poor decisions have been made, which is always 
inevitable even in a deliberative democracy, they can be amended expediently (Fung 
and Wright, 2001, 26). This then helps to reach a balance between legitimacy and 
effectiveness that is central to the Weberian dilemma. Following the completion of this 
process both the forum and the quango could then be dissolved.  Once this had 
occurred, in order for the policy to be changed again, it would have to go through the 
same process again, starting with making it on to the agenda, which again ideally would 
arise through the outside initiative model. Again we see the suitability of quangos for 
the role of forum organiser; due to their flexibility and malleability they fluctuate in and 
out of existence, becoming defunct when the goal for their creation is accomplished, or 
circumstances change making them redundant, but they can also be reincarnated when 
circumstances change again (Flinders, 1997, 33). 
 
If quangos were to organize the forums it would be essential to ensure that they 
do not become tools of the government. However, the likelihood of this is reduced, as 
the forum participants will be partisans, emerging from secondary associations with 
stakes in the decisions providing both incentive and ability to scrutinize the quango. 
Nevertheless, quango appointment must be removed from government control and be 
subject to new laws, which ensure a ‘balanced composition’ (Weir, 1996, 36). Again, 
this is possible due to the malleability of quangos, making it possible to ensure that their 
members include a good socio-economic mix (Skelcher, 1998, 179). It seems that 
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quangos are apt for organizing functionally devolved forums, and in this dualist system, 
enable the expertise of their members to be harnessed by strong measures of democracy, 
citizen participation, openness, transparency, rationality and publicity.  
 
 A new role for government and political parties 
 
New roles for secondary associations and quangos in organizing and forming legislation 
inevitably mean changes for current legislative arenas. American activist Brian 
O’Connel has argued civil society should be seen as a supplement and not a replacement 
to current representative institutions and the arguments here, for a deliberative and 
associational democracy, should be taken in this context. Nevertheless, it should be 
apparent that, in an associational democracy, the legal and political relationships 
between associations and traditional elected legislative arenas and councils would be 
altered dramatically to how they presently stand, which in turn would lead to a changing 
role for political parties. 
 
Local, regional and national government would have a much-reduced role.  They 
would act as an intermediary and interpreter to the competing discourses emerging from 
the informal public spheres and set the agenda for the forums.  In this sense the elected 
parliaments and councils will still retain much power (Schattsneider, 1975), but this 
should still be done deliberatively and involve public participation through mechanisms 
like the electronic town hall (Parkinson, 2006, 170). Following this, it will then be the 
role of the relevant level of government to form a quango to organise the forum, 
although as previously mentioned, quango composition must be restricted by stringent 
laws.  Once a decision in the forum has been reached, it is the role of the relevant level 
of government or quango to implement and enforce the decision.   
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Local and regional councils will then almost entirely be relieved of their 
legislating roles, despite the extra powers that will be devolved from central 
government, as legislation will be formed in the forums.  However, national government 
will retain some legislative powers for decisions that the principle of subsidiary dictates 
need to be made at a national level, foreign policy for example, as problems of 
complexity such as size and number of participants make it unrealistic to be able to hold 
a national mediating forum. To clarify the lines of accountability: National government 
would be accountable to the general electorate for the policy decisions it makes and all 
levels of government would be accountable to the electorate on the agendas they set for 
the forums through the traditional mechanisms of elections and the media, but also 
through, what should be, revitalized informal public spheres. Forums are held 
accountable to the public by the memberships of the secondary associations and again 
the multiple public spheres that will develop around the forums. A combination of the 
forums, the media and the informal public spheres will hold the relevant level of 
government or quango accountable over implementation. 
 
As the role of traditional elected parliaments and councils is reduced, so too is 
the role and dominance of political parties, as they will inevitably have to concede many 
of the roles they fulfill to other types of secondary association. In such an associational 
democracy secondary associations will increasingly become the primary location for 
political participation and through the forums become the dominant legislators. 
However, political parties will still operate and have important, but diminished, 
contributions to make to democracy. For example parliament, government, and local 
councils would still be elected on a party political basis, with the winning party/ parties 
fulfilling the governmental roles outlined above.  Parties would still need to offer policy 
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proposals as national decisions would still be made in parliament and the agenda for the 
forums interpreted by government.  It is therefore likely that political parties will not 
offer wide reaching manifestos as they presently do, but rather policy proposals for 
national government and a list of key issues that they feel must be addressed by the 
forums. As suggested earlier these agenda issues could still be produced through 
consultation with secondary associations and verified by public deliberative events. 
 
Representation in the forums 
 
Although such mediating forums would not allow for direct participation of all 
affected citizens in the decision-making processes, the combination of this institutional 
method with internally democratic associations does. Representation offers a solution to 
the problem of including all in deliberative debates with those not participating directly 
still feeling as though their reasons have been aired by their representatives (Parkinson, 
2006, 29). Secondary associations will form around a myriad of interests and identities, 
and, in an associational democracy, people are likely to be members of a number of 
associations, as they become key political actors, it is therefore likely that someone 
could be represented by a number of representatives in a given forum. Each association 
should have the same number of representatives in the forum, regardless of the size of 
their membership. This is appropriate in a deliberative democracy as it is the inclusion 
of all relevant reasons, rather than an equal representation of all interests and identities 
that is key (Parkinson, 2006, 33-34).  
 
In addition, the dualist model still provides most citizens with the opportunity to 
be involved in deliberative debates, with direct democracy and participation from 
citizens within the secondary associations themselves, followed by representative 
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democracy, with representatives from the associations participating in the forums, 
making it an institutional method similar to what Goodin terms ‘serial’ or ‘disjointed 
deliberation’ (Goodin, 2003, 56). It is this combination between direct and 
representative democracy that enables this dualist model to elude the Weberian 
dilemma. Moreover, as the associational members select those who are to represent them 
in the various forums, there is a principal agent connection which provides a strong and 
direct bond of accountability between represented and representative. This is essential to 
the legitimacy of the forums as they are to be used for decision-making (Parkinson, 
2006, 74-84). It is then essential that each association included in the forums have at 
least a minimal democratic structure otherwise the legitimacy of their representatives 
participating in decision-making is completely undermined (Elstub, 2008). 
 
There are many practical problems, to be overcome, to ensure secondary 
associations are internally democratic such as the iron law of oligarchy, and features of 
social complexity such as time, number and disparity of members. Due to limited space 
these problems cannot be considered here, but are considered in more detail in Elstub 
(2008, chapter 6), with the key point being that it is possible for secondary associations 
to be minimally democratic. One problem, that it is essential to consider here, is 
whether citizens would want to actively participate in associations. However, a 
fundamental belief for anyone who advocates a more participatory system is that if 
people are given real opportunities to participate in decision-making that affects them, 
in a system that means their participation can actually affect those decisions, then most 
will participate to an extent. Consequently, if associations have a democratic internal 
structure, and if associations could influence public policy, the aim of the dualist model 
outlined here, participation could be vastly increased. Nevertheless, if high levels of 
participation are to be maintained in an associational democracy, then participatory 
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demands must not be too excessive, both in the number and duration of meetings.  This 
is why a deliberative and associational democracy can only expect associations to be 
minimally democratic. This involves electing the various representatives for the various 
forums after a debate on the representatives, participating in debate to periodically 
decide the overall aims and methods of the association and participating in debates over 
what ideas, preferences, beliefs and interests should be articulated in the forums and the 
informal public spheres. This might sound like a lot of time consuming participation, 
and is certainly more demanding than the current liberal-democratic system requires. 
However, not all associational members will be interested in every issue that makes it to 
a forum that is relevant to their association as a whole. Therefore, democratisation of 
associations should not be excessively demanding or time consuming. The more time 
required for participation, the less equal participation is, especially as the motivation of 
participants is democracy’s most ‘significant’ resource’ (Blaug, 1999, 145). 
 
Representation is therefore necessary, but the type of representation that is required for 
the forums, must be established. Two central issues, which must be addressed in any 
discussion of representation, are the form of representation and what should be 
represented (Bobbio, 1987, 5). In terms of the latter, associational representatives will 
mainly be representing identities and specific, rather than general interests, as this is the 
nature of secondary associations, which is an important form of representation in a 
deliberative democracy (Phillips, 1995). Therefore we shall focus on how associational 
members should be represented in the forums. 
 
Representatives can either be a ‘delegate’ or a ‘fiduciary’; if a delegate then they 
are bound completely by the wishes of those they represent. In essence the 
representative is spokesperson, without the authority to make decisions.8 In contrast, if 
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the representative is a fiduciary, then they have some powers of authority to act on their 
constituents behalf (Bobbio, 1987, 5). It is apparent the representatives must be bound, 
to a certain extent, by the interests and preferences of the associations from which they 
derive, otherwise the social groups who are currently under-represented will still not 
have their interests represented, and will remain excluded from the decision-making 
processes. However, if they were bound too tightly by previously agreed ideas and 
interests, then many of the benefits that arise from discussion would be prevented from 
occurring as the representatives would not change their preferences in light of new 
information and perspectives and debate would cease to be an exploratory process in 
which new possibilities are created (Parkinson, 2006, 31-32; Hendriks, Dryzek and 
Hunold, 2007, 366). 
 
A balance between the two is therefore required; representatives must be held 
accountable and be bound, to some degree, by the preferences of their associational 
members and open to dismissal if it is felt they have represented their people poorly, but 
they must also be free to participate fully in a discussion, and that means changing 
preferences and goals with which they started. This raises a problem as the 
representative will have been engaged in a democratic debate (in which their 
preferences were likely to be adapted) that the other members were not. Inevitably it 
will be the representative’s constituents, in this case the members of the association, 
which will ‘act as the ultimate safeguard against selling out’ (Amy in Smith, 2001, 80). 
To achieve this Young argues we need ‘representation as relationship’ (Young, 2000, 
125) where the representatives must explain and justify the resulting decision to the 
members and provide the information that caused them to change their preferences, if 
they cannot then ‘perhaps this can be traced to the co-option of the representative by 
other parties’ in the forum (Smith, 2001, 80). In this sense the associational members 
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are still involved in the discussions of the forum. It also highlights the importance of 
agent-principal bonds that the associational representatives in the forums will have, as 
without this, ‘representation as relationship’, and genuine accountability, are very 
difficult to attain (Parkinson, 2006, 32-33). This process of accountability will be aided 
by the publication of the forum’s minutes and the forum’s meetings could also be 
filmed and made available as a podcast, both being available on the quango’s website. 
Furthermore, the mass media is likely to scrutinise, and publicise, forum debates to 
some degree given their legislative function. In addition forums are unlikely to be a one 
off event, so debate between associational representatives and members should occur 
before, during and after the forum process. 
 
With the partisan role of representation outlined in this dualist associational 
model there is a significant danger that the representatives from the secondary 
associations will not be open to the transformation of preferences that is essential to the 
legitimacy of deliberative democracy (Smith, 2000), with associational representative’s 
preferences being too inflexible to make them competent deliberators (Hendriks, 2006, 
497). Urbinati is adamant that passionate commitment, likely to be channelled through 
associational representatives, will not undermine the possibility of preference 
transformation (Urbinati, 2000, 775). In fact, Immergut thinks that associational 
representatives are more likely to change their preferences than unpartisan citizens, as 
they will think of ‘policy packages’ that require compromise (Immergut, 1995, 205). 
The empirical evidence is mixed and limited, with some research (Pelletier et al, 1999; 
Hendriks, 2002, 70; Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007) suggesting that partisan 
representatives will not significantly alter their preferences in deliberative situations, 
and other research indicating they will (Elstub, 2003, chapter 7; Fung and Wright, 2003; 
Parkinson 2006, 136). Nevertheless, the norm in partisan forums seems to be for 
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agreement to be ‘elusive’ (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007), unless the decisions 
are addressing local and specific issues, which has already been advocated as essential 
for the associational forums outlined here (Fung and Wright, 2003).  
 
Despite this mixed range of empirical evidence, participants, in a deliberative 
democracy, should be partisans to ensure that the information, needs and beliefs 
expressed are authentic and genuine: ‘Far from transcending the specific situation of 
citizens, deliberative reasoning rests on the premise that specificity needs to be known 
and acknowledged’ (Urbinati, 2000, 776). Empirical evidence indicates partisanship 
provides greater motivation to participate (Parkinson, 2006, 134; Fung, 2003, 345), 
increases the sustainability of the forums, is necessary for preference change to be 
reflective, and for the decisions to be supported and implemented (Fung, 2003, 345).  
Representatives in the forums must then be given some element of freedom to operate, 
but this does not involve the complete abandonment of sectional interests.  
 
The Danger of Co-option 
 
An important and established criticism of dualist strategies is the iron law of oligarchy 
(Michels, 1959). The theory suggests that legislative inclusion and institutionalisation of 
civil society will necessarily result in ‘cooptation, deradicalisation, professionalisation, 
bureaucratisation and centralisation’ and eventually the dilution of aims (Cohen and 
Arato, 1992, 557). Such trends go against the aims, this article has argued, the dualist 
model can achieve as it would not deepen democracy and, therefore, be an unsuitable 
method to institutionalise deliberative democracy and could not lead to the generation of 
the normative ends attributed to deliberative democracy.  Such considerations have 
prompted Dryzek and Hendriks to be against the inclusion of associations in the state or 
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legislation altogether, seeing such a system as exclusive and unable to challenge 
inequalities, predicting associations would only ever be symbolically included and, 
moreover, co-opted (Dryzek, 2000, 85; Hendriks, 2006, 497) and empirical research 
does suggest that certain groups do exclude themselves from potential state inclusion for 
fear of co-option (Elstub, 2003, chapter 7; Hendriks, 2002; Parkinson, 2006; Sagoff, 
1999; Thomas, 2003). Specifically, they suggest that inclusion reduces opposition with 
no real power transference and that public policy is already determined due to state 
imperatives. 
 
However, the point of the dualistic approach, considered here, is that there is no 
loss of a vigorous civil society, because the groups still remain there, whilst also gaining 
a legislative role.  Implicit in Dryzek’s argument is that the same association cannot 
achieve both elements of a dualistic strategy, but this surely depends on the institutional 
framework that incorporates associations into the state and this article suggests a 
devolved forum system could ensure this, and there are examples of associations that 
have combined oppositional and co-operative strategies (Wood, 2001; Warren, 2001b). 
It is apparent that those associations that participated in the forum, that produced, but 
disagreed with the policy, could still oppose it through contributing to critical discourse 
in the informal public sphere. Associations that agreed to the policy, or most of its 
elements, would have their oppositional edge blunted to a degree, but could still oppose 
other policies as well as criticising the interpretation of the agenda. As participation in 
the forums is, to a large extent, self-selecting, such oppositional groups could not be 
excluded from the forums in the future, which reduces the capability of the state to co-
opt them. 
 
The second claim is that inclusion of all relevant secondary associations is 
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unnecessary because policy is never completely undetermined. All states must fulfil the 
imperatives of accumulation and legitimation, which means that groups in opposition to 
the state will be incorporated impotently, and only when their interest is directly related 
to a state imperative. Yet, there does seem to be more scope for secondary associations 
being included into the policy process than Dryzek gives credit for.  The state 
imperatives of legitimation and accumulation, although restricting, are very broad and 
leave plenty of scope and plenty of alternatives for public policy, particularly as these 
imperatives can be in conflict meaning trade-offs need to be made.  Consequently, civil 
society could play a relevant role in deciding where the trade-offs between these 
imperatives should be made, even if it is inevitably constrained from abandoning one 
altogether. Furthermore, there are many areas of public policy that have little relevance 
to either of the state imperatives, so the role of associations here seems even less 
constrained.9 As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, initial institutional change 
must accept liberal democratic structures and the capitalist economy as being in place. 
These forces inevitably bring limitations too, as well as supportive conditions for, 
democratisation with them, and state imperatives of accumulation and legitimation are 
characteristic of these opposing forces. 
 
Conclusion 
 
On a normative level, it has been suggested that deliberative democracy can make 
citizen’s preferences more prudent, making them more autonomous, lead to ‘true’ 
decisions which represent the public good and represents a fair set of procedures for 
making decisions. However these goals cannot be achieved unless deliberative 
democracy can be meaningfully approximated. In doing this the ideal of deliberative 
democracy faces a Weberian dilemma; how to ensure that deliberation and democracy 
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are effectively combined so that citizens actively engage in deliberation while ensuring 
the results of the deliberations are actualised into binding decisions.  
 
Weber’s dilemma can never be completely avoided, and is always present in 
practical considerations of democracy. Indeed in the course of this paper we have seen 
several tensions between democracy and deliberation: Overall there is the tension 
between achieving efficiency in decision-making and deliberation and increasing 
participation and the problem of linking macro deliberation in the informal public 
sphere with micro deliberation and decision-making. Dualism itself was seen as the 
solution, with the same associations participating in each. More specific tensions 
included agenda setting. It was suggested the informal public sphere can, and should, set 
the agenda, as it provides a relatively open arena for communication between 
associations in civil society to raise a variety of concerns. However, micro-deliberative 
arenas, where decisions are made, require clearly defined and specific agendas for 
efficient decision-making, which the informal public sphere cannot provide. 
Governments will inevitably play a key role in this process, but should invoke 
mechanisms for popular deliberation too. Secondly, there was inequality of access to the 
informal public sphere, resulting in the voice of subordinate groups being excluded or 
peripherised. Multiple and fluid associational membership, multiple public spheres 
provided by a multiplicity of legislative forums; a role fulfilled here through the 
devolved deliberative mediating forums, and close relations with micro-publics, once 
again the forums, were thought to alleviate inequalities, but other measures are also 
required to help achieve greater equality. Paradoxically, further democratisation and 
greater opportunities for decisive participation would most likely produce decisions that 
would take us towards greater equality and the dualist model of a deliberative and 
associational democracy is offered as a method to achieve this.  We are then caught in a 
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‘vicious circle’ (Macpherson, 1977, 100); we cannot achieve greater equality without 
participation in associations and deliberatively democratic decision-making, but 
alternatively we cannot have either of these without greater equality. Ultimately to 
break the cycle we must try and increase participation and decrease inequality 
simultaneously (Macpherson, 1977, 101).   Given deliberative democracy’s need for 
preference transformation we also considered whether decisions should be responsive to 
reflective preferences regardless of whether these decisions are rationally compatible 
and how associational members should be represented, by delegates or fiduciaries.  
 
In this model, territorially and functionally devolved forums, guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity, are employed to ensure citizen’s deliberations effect decisions, with 
quangos providing the flexible organisation to host these forums.   Within the forums, 
representatives from interested secondary associations assemble to make decisions 
based upon the norms of deliberative democracy. Further connection between citizen’s 
deliberations and democratic decision-making is ensured by the requirement that these 
representatives must come from secondary associations that comply with the norms of 
deliberative democracy at a basic level, although the paper accepts that there are 
significant practical problems in achieving this element.  In addition it is suggested that 
civil society can produce a vital and dynamic informal public sphere that enables these 
associations to deliberate which can transform opinion, oppose the state, influence the 
agenda and form networks based upon communication and co-operation.  Co-option is a 
significant danger to such a system, but with the same associations participating in the 
informal and formal public sphere, there is still plenty of opportunity for critiques of the 
state. The current liberal democratic and capitalist system inevitably limits the ability of 
the dualist model of deliberative and associational democracy to respond effectively to 
these dilemmas in terms of eliminating private influences of pressure groups, achieving 
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equal levels of power among all socio-economic groups and in terms of avoiding co-
option, but we must start from the here and now and that means liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, this model offers genuine and radical alternatives to the current 
institutional make-up that will approximate deliberative democracy much closer. This is 
not to say that the dualist model is the only possible method to achieve an effective link 
between citizen’s deliberations and decision-making and macro and micro deliberation, 
but it is one possible institutional mix that emphasises the importance of democracy as 
well as deliberation. If deliberative democracy can be approximated in practice then it 
becomes a more persuasive theory as it means the normative goals attributed to it could 
actually be achieved, which is why the dualist method is significant.  
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 An alternative dualist model if offered by Habermas (1996), but this fails to provide a sufficient link 
between popular deliberation and decision-making for a good discussion of these see Bohman (1996), 
Leib (2004) and Hendriks (2006).   
2 In the dualist system here this method would be reduced due to the devolved legislative forums that 
secondary associations could participate in. 
3 This is obviously a circular argument, however, what it is suggesting is that once an associational 
democracy has been achieved the ‘outside initiative model’ of agenda setting, will be much more 
predominant than it is now.  The problem remains how to achieve the associational model in the first 
place, so that this phenomenon can occur.  See Elstub (2008) for a more detailed consideration of 
transition. 
4 Subsidiarity is being used here in its more traditional Catholic sense of territorial and functional 
devolution (Kohler, 1993, 617), rather than its current meaning in the E.U of giving local bureaucrats the 
power to make discretionary decisions (Follesdal, 1999). 
5 This is not to say that secondary associations could not influence these decisions, as through 
participating in informal public spheres they should influence opinion and the agenda at national and 
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transnational level. However, the problems of scale that affect deliberative democracy are most acute at 
these levels, and they are therefore unlikely to have the opportunity to make final policy decisions. 
6 Pettit (2003) demonstrates through a series of examples that this can occur even when all participant’s 
preferences are internally rational and consistent. 
7 This is a disadvantage in terms of deliberative democracy, because if it is not an ongoing process, 
factors such as the ‘civilising force of hypocrisy’ do not pertain, to the same extent (See Mackie, 1998, 
84-85; Dryzek, 2000, 46). 
8 Nevertheless, the delegate is still an intermediary, as it is inevitable that there is some scope for the 
delegate to act. Without this, collective decision-making would be impossible, or at least ridiculously 
time consuming as the delegate would have to continuously go and consult the represented and present 
them with the details of the debate so far so that they could provide her with a mandate of what to do next 
(Bobbio, 1987, 10). 
9 A point that Dryzek (2000) accepts, but dismisses as peripheral zones of public policy, which must still 
not transgress the state imperatives.   
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